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è implementation of policies, governmental or not, is an interesting domain for
scientists, particularly when it concerns developing countries. In these
in contrast to countries with a well-established democratie tradition, the
ical influence of many societal groups mostly concentrâtes on implementation
than on législation and policy formulation which are often processes far
-«ïdÉoved from their sphère of influence. According to Grindle (1980: 15,19 cited by
fofpaayeveld 1993: 22), the implementation comes about in 'the major arena in which
VfftEviduals and groups are able to pursue conflicting interests and compete for access
It4rf' f'"'
-to',8carce resources'. Only in the implementation phase do individuals or groups, notJ!?"'.j
ff^tively represented in the formulation of policy, have the opportunity to promote
interests, and they may do so by interpreting and manipulating the new
Ëcies to their own advantage. The question is whether this also applies to the
Implementation of environmental laws and policies.
, 'fJa. Senegal, as probably in many other countries also, the implementation of
i&vironmental policies, by the National Forestry Service (Les Eaux et Forêts) has
älways been surrounded by rumours of external political interventions, thwarting
*|e policy of the forestry service and discouraging its agents. Fortunately, we have
lyailable two cases of policy implementation and failure, which are well-documented
•; tna analyzed in the literature. These cases are, first, the réglementation by the
•v?> Jovernment of charcoal production in order to limit and control deforestation, and,
*1"'|écond, the conservation policy with regard to forest reserves, in particular the
-Mbegue reserve (Forêt Classée).
~r/ The aims of this paper are, firstly, to show the nature and importance of the
^JJpHtical interventions according to the authors of the case studies, and, secondly, to
''Argue on the basis of other written sources that these interventions are not detached
- Jttcidents but are to be considered as inherent in the country's political system and
/'tfaerefore difficult to prevent.
•V/ To these ends we will first present a summary of our case studies and the reported
"«öeasons for failure. Then we will take an opposite perspective and look at some
Jrterature on Senegal's economie and political development. Finally we will try to
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explore some of thé implications of Senegal's clientelist System for thé implemen-
ion of environmental policies.
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tati
Governmental policies to control charcoal production j
|
Since thé early 1970s thé government has been well aware of thé process of j
deforestation. This has resulted in a number of measures to reduce thé pressure on j
the natural forests (alternative fuel; improved stoves; tree-planting, first on a large J
scale and later small-scale social forestry), ail with very limited success (Ribot 1990; j
Plan National 1989; van den Breemer et al 1993). j
Another package of measures concerned charcoal production. The demand for|
charcoal was-and still is-predominantly an urban one, as rural households mostly useï
wood for fuel (Bergeret and Ribot 1990: 144-145). It was realized that this produc-;
tion, although not the principal one, was an important and moreover a very visiblej
cause of deforestation. Therefore, thé government tried to evolve a 'rational', that isj
a sustainable exploitation of the natural forests. This meant that charcoal production!
had to be regulated to keep it under control. The Loi sur k domaine national of 196l
served as thé légal basis for this régulation. According to this law, all land that is npl
used for productive objectives exclusively belongs to the state, together with thj
forests and trees on it. Moreover, the state owned many forest reserves, inheritefj
from colonial times. 11
Measures and régulations adopted by thé government
According to Ribot (1990) thé governmental policies have been developed step
step. In 1972 the commercial producers of charcoal were obliged to apply fofj
licence and they were encouraged to organize themselves in coopératives. From 19'
onwards yearly quotas for charcoal production were fixed and distributed. In 19
the National Union of Charcoal Coopératives was created and membership cA
coopérative was made a condition for a licence. However, a small number of B
enterprises were exempted from this obligation (Bergeret and Ribot 1990:151).
In 1986 Ribot found a set of measures of which thé following are thé
important:
1. Every year a national production quota is fixed below thé demand for charcoal»
order to raise thé consumers' priée and to stimulate thé use of other
sources thus saving forests and trees. This national quota is divided
officially recognized production zones.
ofi
L, The production season is limited to thé dry season (November-July): dry wood
-gjves a higher yield and saves forests, while thé soil is less damaged by thé large
trucks.
'̂ Only dead trees may be felled.
i, Within each production zone, thé annual quota for that zone is distributed among
"thé registered coopératives and enterprises by a régional committee under thé
! supervision of the governor. Part of thé quota is reserved (by way of incentive)
>.fof licensees who hâve used their quota quickly or who hâve replanted a certain
yery year all members of the coopératives and thé entrepreneurs must buy a
e nce for themselves as well as for each of their labourers, who on top of that
,aeed a labour licence, valid for forty days; this is thé period needed for thé
rjproduction process, from felling the dead trees to filling thé bags with charcoal.
^^ten thé production of one heap is ready, the entrepreneur must buy a licence
*4j| -transport (Permis de circulation], valid for three days, or a licence to stock thé
-jMöduce (Permis de stockage). If, later on, he décides to transport, hè must buy a
~.l|eiice and pay a certain amount per bag.
thé necessary licenses to produce are obtained, thé agents of the Forestry
allot areas of forest to thé entrepreneurs or coopératives. The criteria used
a plot are proneness of thé soil to érosion and thé présence of
t dead trees. When a plot has been exploited a régénération period of 20
must be observed before it may be allotted again.
.prices for licenses, taxes and the consumer's price must be fixed by thé
of Commerce in Dakar, in consultation with thé Forestry Service.
in isolation from social reality this policy seems quite cohérent and
^ponable except perhaps for thé large number of licences required.
ofthe governmental measures and régulations
ijjloiwever, thé ends, namely thé réduction of deforestation and thé preven-
||||fef-exploitation of the forest, are not realized at aË. What has been
to Ribot, are financial revenues for the state and the Forestry
three short-comings in particular.
^^ijlproduction season is not observed. In reality production goes on thé
fbund. The employers ask for and obtain a licence to stock at the end of
m; without having any stock. In thé meantime they carry on with thé
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production and they gather in the charcoal later under the pretext that it comes
from their own stock. The agents of the Forestry Service do not make any inspec-
tions in the forest, nor do they verify whether stocks exist or not. They sometimes
even give transport permits, when it is obvious that the charcoal has been produced
outside the official season.
Second, the production quotas are not respected. Apart from the disregard for the
official season mentioned above, there is an unequal access to the reserve quota. The
employers who are the first to have used their initial quota, or who have planted ̂
trees, are the ones who employ many labourers and are rieh. Moreover, they may,|
have connections with ministers or high state officials outside or inside the Forestry ;.
Service and use these to acquire additional quotas. This has resulted in the rise of a ,
small group of rieh employers in the charcoal sector who consume the reserve quota ,
and a large majority of small employers who-to their dissatisfaction-never receive
any additional quota.
This small minority also has access to a special kind of licence, namely the land
exploitation quota (Quota de défrichement) for the establishment of big farms. This
implies an extra yield of wood and charcoal. :
There is another way to escape from the official distribution of quotas. AÊ
employer who has used his quota, may order his labourers to start the production o$
charcoal without any licence, outside the allotted plot. When the production proces^
is finished, the employer himself informs the Forestry Service about this illeeafc
production. The charcoal is than confiscated (in name) whereupon the emplo;
who has reported the illégal production, may buy a receipt (quittance) which permi
him to transport and seil this charcoal.
Third, the deforestation is aggravated (instead of stopped) because the officii
policy does not take into account that the villagers in the charcoal production zont
need to use products from the forest on a daily basis to earn their living and tt
they cannot allow the forest the necessary time (20 years) to regenerate. The critei
for the sélection of forest areas are physical in nature (soil not prône to érosion
many dead trees), no social criterium being involved. The result is that the j
chosen are nearly always in the vicinity of a village. This is profitable for
employers, for they can lodge their labourers there, and it brings short-term pr<
to the villagers who receive some money for housing and food. The labouï
however, do not only feil dead trees, they also eut trees with only some d
branches, or they treat the bark of living trees in such a way that they soon
After some time the végétation around the villages is largely decimated, so,
villagers have to look for wood, leaves, roots and fruits at a greater distance froi»
village. Their sheep, goats and cattle roam around freely, eating up any m«
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|,\|;Ageneration. Thus villages that ever received a large group of labourers will always
|f fesurrounded by plains with scant végétation. By disregarding the needs of the local
; %|Aimunities, the Forestry Service exploits the forest in a non-sustainable way.
reasons offailure
%R failure of the government policy on the commercial exploitation of forests for
' must according to Ribot be regarded as the result of an interplay of both
^«tomal and internai factors.
^ ^\
| Internai factors are the conditions under which the Forestry Service must carry
Ht- tts duties and which are outside its control. The main task of the Forestry
diee ijithe sustainable exploitation of the state forests. In reality, however, a
tion has become manifest between the duty to protect the forests and the
provide urban households with charcoal. Moreover, the last task brings
mues to the Forest Service which is in constant lack of means, while the
ion of the forests only costs money.
external factors are the growing urban demand for charcoal, the lack of
carrency to buy gas or petrol as a substitute for charcoal and the limited
! isterest in social forestry or improved domestic stoves. The Forestry Service
fix the national quota below demand in order to raise the consumer priée
itO encourage the urban consumer to use alternative fuels and save energy, but as
shortage or price increase threaten, the urban and national politicians
protest strongly to the Forest Service management. Thus,
ation of national quotas and urban priées is not feasible for political reasons,
ctor in this failure, which is probably somewhat more under the
* '
f the Forestry Service, is the lack of social criteria in the allotment of forests
ïè-fefikjg. The remit of the Forestry Service is to manage forests for the state
cities with charcoal in an orderly and efficiënt way. They forget to
account the use that rural communities make of the surrounding forest
%thereby neglecting a real partner in sustainable exploitation.
internai factor for which-according to Ribot-the Forestry Service is
, concerns the policy of reserving a part of the national quota for
i -who have used up their quota quickly or who have replanted a certain
tice, this means that the rieh employers are privileged at the expense of a
r of small employers. In this way the Forestry Service helped to create a
\ of rieh employers who have a quasi-monopoly in the charcoal sector.
! of „this small group have connections with important officials at all
ety and they use any means at their disposai, that is money or social
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relationships, to get access to extra quotas. At the local level, they are permitted, by
means of bribes or by the intervention of powerful friends, to produce charcoal i
where and when they want, without being penalised by the Forestry Service agents.
At the regional or national level, they have an important influence on the
distribution of quotas, in direct contact with the relevant authorities or indirectly by
means of ministers or marabouts (Muslim spiritual leaders). Many ministers and
officials at all levels of the bureaucratie system are talibé (followers) of an important!
marabout. •
The national conservation policy and the Mbegue reserve
Since the long dry period in 1972-1974 the Senegalese government has been acutelyl
aware of environmental problems. Many efforts were made to reduce the pressura
on the natural forests, to limit the production and consumption of charcoal and tel
plant forests and trees for timber, fuel, fodder, etc. (van den Breemer et al.
1995). A considérable number of social forestry projects has been undertaken
that time (Guèye et al 1994), involving grants from foreign donors. Gonzalez, in hi||
review-study of 1992, reports that in the period 1973-1992 the international dono|l
invested 215 millions of US dollars and the Senegalese government 4.3 billion
CFK, in 18 completed and 29 current natural resources projects. Ir
Against the background of all these efforts, the décision of the government ÎJ
early 1991 to concède 45, 000 ha of the sylvo-pastoral reserve of Mbegue f3
commercial agriculture (groundnut cultivation) came as a complete surpri«
Schoonmaker Freudenberger (1991) and GÜlot (1992) shed some light on
conservation policies in Senegal since early colonial times and the events in
with regard to the Mbegue reserve.
Conservation policies
The concern of the government for forests, trees and soils dates back to the colod
period. Although happy at the enormous expansion of the groundnut cultivatil
especially through the Muslim Brotherhood of the Mourides, the government i
already worried about the ill effects of that expansion for the marginal areas
the agro-pastoralist Fulbe (Schoonmaker 1991: 5-6). It was decided to
commercial groundnut cultivation away from the vulnérable soils of the higher
by reserving these areas for the pastoralists. They were allowed to graze their
there and to lay out fields for their own use. They were believed not to disturb r™
^
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Illpronrnent too much, as they maintained the soil fertility with the manure of their
And so, in 1936, the forest of Mbegue was declared protected. It was given the
of a sylvo-pastoral zone in 1952, and covered an area of 73, 000 ha
Illjioonmaker 1991:11). In 1949 a water-hole was drilled in the centre of the reserve
called Khelkhom to provide water for the agro-pastoralists.
independence, the protection of the Forêts Classées and sylvo-pastoral zones
In the 1970s, following the long dry period and the encroaching
the Forestry Service started to make life harder for the agro-
fcralists by imposing more restrictions and fines on their use of the natural
concession of the Mbegue forest and its environmental effects
Jânuary 1991, President Abdou Diouf signed an agreement (Contrat de mise-en-
'e) with the General Khalifa of the Mouride Brotherhood. By this agreement the
Ufa was allowed to use 45,000 ha of the Mbegue forest for commercial groundnut
ation, while the legal status of this sylvo-pastoral zone was not officially
l (Schoonmaker 1991:11).
}<Ön April 3,1991 a group of agro-pastoralists, alarmed by rumours, sent a letter to
requesting him to protect their rights and to preserve the forest for
Schoonmaker, 1991:14), but without avail. They also wrote to the opposition
ISOPI, but, according to Schoonmaker (1991:17) its editors did not react for
jhal the power of the Mouride Brotherhood.
Ia April 25, a genera! appeal was made on the radio to all Mourides in Senegal to
fto Khelkhom with their machetes and axes to eut trees. Over a period of three
ï 45,000 ha were stripped of trees and shrubs. To control this mass opération
;was given by several governmental services: ambulance, police, fire-brigade
l the Forestry Service.
; 6,000 Fulbe pastoralists, with some 100,000 head of cattle, took refuge in
part of the reserve (28, 000 ha), that had been maintained as a sylvo-
eï but there were no permanent water sources (Schoonmaker 1991:14).
ttdïtu't cultivation demands that trees and shrubs be removed. The
; plant extracts many nutrients from the soil, and at the harvest the whole
i jpwîîed up from the soil, the nuts as well as haulm being used or sold,
i hardly any organic material being left behind in the soil. If no other
available, the soil will soon be exhausted and irreparably damaged,
pin this marginal area. In the eastern part of the reserve the risk of over-
L is high, given the large number of people and cattle expelled from the
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western part and given the already existing safety-net fonction for the pastoralists
from more distant zones. Thus, from an environmental point of view this large-scale
opération must be considered a failure of the conservation policy. There are
rumours, however, that under pressure of international attention efforts at
sustainable land use are being made (Gillot 1992).
The reasons for the failure of the conservation policy at Mbegue
Schoonmaker gives a predominantly historical explanation, in which the structural
actors and factors may be discerned. She argues that the events in Mbegue are not
isolated incidents but that they are the last of a whole series of clashes. From early
colonial times onwards the government as well as the leaders of the Mouride
Brotherhood were both interested in raising commercial groundnut cultivation for '.
export. The increase in production took place on the basis of extensive land-use and i
thus implied migration to sparsely populated areas by groups of young Mourides,!
the daara. In this migratory process they came across groups of agro-pastoralists|
From about 1930 onwards this regularly resulted in conflicts involving bloodshed|
The colonial courts mostly decided in favour of the Mourides and when this wasj
incidentally not the case, the Mourides came in overwhelming numbers andl
appropriated the land. Subsequently this was tacitly tolerated by the governmentj
One example is the forest of Deali. In 1951 the government drilled a water-hol j
there, for the benefit of the pastoralists and their cattle. A few months later tha
Mouride leaders demanded territory near the water-hole. The Forestry Serviel
refused the demand but higher authorities agreed. And so, in January 1954, a largl
group of followers (talibé) appeared, who cleared l, 200 ha within three days, whiH
treating the pastoralist Fulbe aggressively. The government did not intervene. lp
1966 the Mouride leaders managed to acquire 10, 000 ha of the forests of Deali ara
Boullel, and some years later another 19,000 ha. In 1971 they obtained 80, 000 ha m
the forest at Doli. Between 1977 and 1990 they claimed and received a large part <j|
the Bakedji district, at the expense of the agro-pastoralist Fulbe. In 1991 it was
turn of the forest of Mbegue (Schoonmaker 1991: 7-10). Thus the events in
must be regarded as yet another conflict between the groundnut growing, expandijjj
Mouride agriculturalists, predominantly Wolof, and the agro-pastoralist
under the auspices of a government who offered tacit agreement. JU
A closer examination is required of the three main protagonists and their i
relationships: the colonial and post-colonial government, the Brotherhood of
Mourides and the agro-pastoralists.
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* The policies of the colonial government were dominated by the aspiration to
%»ther the commercial cultivation of groundnuts. As early as the colonial period, it
Tjfid found a local partner in the Mounde Brotherhood who realised on its own
initiative an enormous expansion of groundnut culture. The agro-pastoralist Fulbe,
the contrary, were often an obstacle to Mouride expansion, while their cattle
»bandry made no significant contribution to the national economy. The result
a government policy of tolerating the behaviour of the Mourides towards the
i-pastoralists. After political independence the economie orientation of the new
rernment found its expression in the land law (Loi sur le domaine national) of
|?64. According to this law the state owns all land and is authorized to transfer
^safructuary rights to all its citizens on condition that the receiver uses them in an
lecpomically useful way (the principle of Mise-en-valeur, i.e. adding economie value).
Jbxording to this criterium the land-use of the agro-pastoralists is considered as non-
ercductive, as not adding any value (Schoonmaker 1991:19; Gillot 1992). Moreover,
tpfe government started to accuse the agro-pastoralists of dégradation of the
ÊJörfironrnent, disregarding the fact that so much of the pasture land had been
actor, the Brotherhood, was founded at the end of the 19th Century.
"" ; to their ideology a personal relation of the adhèrent (Talibé) with a
fspiritual leader (Marabout) is regarded as indispensable for personal
gf. TLoyalty to the religious leader is fundamental. One expression of this is
fi labour for the Marabout. The resulting strong, religious work ethic focused
jlinain economie opportunity in the early colonial period, the growing of
This religious work ethic was the driving force behind the migration to
jHteikted areas and the expansion of the groundnut cultivation there. The
||0ï"the religious leaders and the work ethic made the brotherhood an
IJfpillar of the colonial state, in an economie as well as a political respect
™ iker 1991:2-5). The colonial government could not afford to disregard the
ijieeds of the religious leaders. After political independence their influence
Jpaened. They acquired a position of quasi-monopoly in public transport
supported by large groups of migrants in the U.S. and Europe. With
pction of universal suffrage, the principle of loyalty to the religious leader
political block of about two million voters. The leaders of the
"1 have always given their support to the government and the dominant
'Parti Socialiste, P.S.). To maintain this indispensable électoral support,
fand party in turn have to meet some of the wishes of the religious
the context of this mutual support, the head of the State, who was at
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the same time the leader of government and P.S., signed the agreement by which the
religions leaders received free access to the greater part of the Mbegue reserve.
The third actor, the agro-pastoralist Fulbe, has in the course of time fallen into an
antagonistic inter-relationship with the Mourides. Moreover, although originally
used as a buffer against the Mouride expansion to marginal areas, they were more
and more regarded by the government as obstacles to economie development, as
economically worthless, and finally also as destroyers of the environment. No
wonder that in Mbegue again they were the losers, when confronted with the
powerful alliance between the Mouride leaders and the government and party-
(Schoonmaker 1991-18-19).
The economie and political developments in Senegal
Up to now two case studies have been summarized: one in which the governmental,
policy did not achieve the intended goals, and another in which the government'
infringed its own policy and rules. In both cases political interventions are indicated;-
as one of the main causes of failure. These firm conclusions in both case studies"
suggest a closer look at the economie and political development in Senegal in order-
to see whether the political interventions in our case studies happen to be incidental
or structural in nature. An interesting source on this subject is Boone (1994), a
summary of her earlier book published in 1992.
With political independence in 1960 power was taken over by a governmeiit
under the supervision of Senghor and his party, the then U.P.S. Within the
government several ideological and interests groups were represented. Senghor trid|
to manage this diversity in consultation with the religious leaders of the Mourmi^
Brotherhood and other rural elites. This alliance between government and Mourida
leaders dates from colonial times. These rural leaders had economie power and thef*
were able to mobilize important électoral support (Boone 1994: 169, Fatton 198f
65-67). In the first years of his government Senghor regularly had troubles with tl
young, reform-oriented intellectuals in his government and party. They tried by ft
movement of the Animation rurale to change the political relations in the rural ar
and to limit the power of the rural elite among whom were the Marabouts. In 1%
Senghor feit obliged to remove these reformists from his government. He did sig|
want to jeopardize the alliance with the leaders of the Mourides. This crisis had tteèl
main effects: the rise of the one-party state and the reinforcement of the alliance •$&"^
the Mouride leaders. The rise of the one-party state implied that, in a situation!- ^
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*•£- Weakening parliamentary control, the important administrative posts were occupied
| 'Jbf party-members. More then ever before they allocated state resources for party or
ends. They distributed subsidies, jobs, contracts, crédits, licences and
in such a way that political dissidents were attracted to commit themselves
\ - *
Ï̂Q,, the party or to their faction (tendance) and groupings around rivais of Senghor
j^Were splintered (Boone 1994:170, Fatton 1987: 73). At the same time the rural elites
iî^ere allowed to take leadership positions in the state coopératives, that means they
f ipêre allowed to profit by the distribution of agricultural inputs and by buying the
I^QTtndnuts from the farmers (see also van Hoven 1995: 44-55). They could enjoy
f ï^fafe privilege on condition that they successfully took care of two things: first, that
ï |thar.subordinates voted for the party or a certain candidate, and second, that the
•r's priée for the groundnuts remained low so that the government could
ie maximum profit in the international market. So the party members in the
'nment distributed state resources among their clients as did the rural elite and
'àbouts among the rural population. In short, clientelism and cooptation had
fhe means of staying in power and of consolidation.
fhe government acquired its financial resources predominantly from commercial
tipns and taxes on commercial activities. In 1960 the government established
monopoly on the buying-up and the export of groundnuts. To this end a
government organisation was formed, the OCA (Boone 1994:172). Exclusive
bl of the groundnut trade was considered necessary for appropriating the
returns from export and for gaining the allegiance of the rural elite and
them the rural population. This OCA became a powerful source for the
of patronage.
establishment of the state monopoly was a serious blow to the French and
commercial firms, who abruptly retired from the rural areas. Although the
t gave them a certain protection against potential competitors, it imposed
many levies and taxes, while potential opposition groups were split up by
according favours to certain commercial firms.
he_ withdrawal of the foreign trading houses from the rural areas,
Ities arose for Senegalese traders. So, until the OCA was operational on a
fcale in 1968, the government selected 1000 traders every year, to undertake
aß the groundnuts. To get a trading licence, allegiance to the party or to a
ate was obligatory.
fanport trade also, the government started, from 1963 onwards, to create
for Senegalese traders who were allied to the party. However, in order
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to raise its revenues, the government decided to establish another state monopoly on
the trade of a number of imported goods, among which was rice. To this end a
national body was created, the SONADIS, to buy these goods from French
importers and seil them in state shops or to privileged traders.
The banks which were still exclusively in French hands in the 1960s had no
confidence in the Senegalese traders and made no crédits available to them. So their
only source of credit was the government. They had to negotiate with the
government to be selected and to obtain licences and crédits. The same holds for
Senegal's industrialists. The government had issued protectionist measures on the'
one hand and a large number of licences and permits on the other. All these licences
and mies invested the state officials with great power to apply these, or give exemp- ;
tions, at will. Like the traders, the industrialists had to negotiate with the
government to obtain licences, contracts, exemptions, subsidies or favours. This
created entrepreneurs who were not primarily interested in investment in produc-
tive activities but who had to give priority to acquiring profits from the government
and maintaining their privileged position. Moreover, government officials and
politicians also appropriated favours for themselves, whether or not using men of
straw. In this way then, after 1963 an elite of rieh Senegalese businessmen appearedj,
for whom the main way to wealth was through party and government and not
through investment in productive activities. -^
In 1968 another political crisis broke out (Boone 1994: 176-180). France wâ|
obliged by the European Community to abolish the subsidy on groundnuts, whicfc:
resulted in a 20% decrease of the producer's price in Senegal and in political unrest »£
the groundnut basin. In the urban zones students and labourers protested against th
power monopoly of the party and the neo-colonial policy of the government w
had protected French commercial firms and had left the French banks untouched.
this pandemonium 2, 600 Senegalese traders joined in a new organization (UNIGE
which claimed the privatization of the groundnut and the rice trade. Il,
government managed to divide the organization by offering personal advantages aw
privileges to a number of rieh traders and to persuade these to create an alternatif
union of traders (COFEGES). Many members of this alternative organizat»
already had connections with the party and some had important functions in "'"
OCA or SONADIS. The alternative union officially expressed its loyalty to
government but insisted, nevertheless, on access to foreign capital and credit«
Senegalese traders. The government promised to create credit facilities and suc""
in realizing a fusion of the two organizations into one (the GES). However,
this organization, in 1970, requested the abolition of the state monopoly on4;
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it trade the government refused, bribed the important leaders and engaged
be clientèle network, and dissolved the organization.
f the effects of this crisis was that the government had become well aware
iterests of the traders and tried to create more opportunities in the
ial sector but always in such a way that the sources for the patronage
mained intact. Another effect was the reinforcement of what Boone calls a
• class: wealthy businessmen, marabouts, politicians and state officials, who
Ced from their allegiance to the party or a faction within it, and who used
not to invest it in productive activities, but to maintain the favouritism
non-competitive market conditions which brought them wealth. They
their profit in political relations as far as they did not use it to buy urban or
or transfer it to banks abroad. Around 1980 the official import trade was
'Senegalized' that means in the hands of a small group of favourites of the
*?nt and party.
was another group which claimed its share during the crisis of 1968-1970,
fetfie rural elite and in particular the leaders of the Mourides. They sought
ition for the decreasing groundnut priées and they found this in large-scale
jgïwith The Gambia. They escaped from the state monopoly on the
'̂ trade by transporting their produce to The Gambia where higher priées
llAlso the extent of the smuggling of imported goods from The Gambia
trmously, as there were fewer and lower levies and taxes in thate capital of the Mourides, became in fact a duty-free zone insidei of the Mourides protected the smugglers against penalties by theovernment accepted the losses as the price for électoral support,exodus had started from the groundnut basin to the urban areas.t needed the Marabouts even more, to keep also their urbanmtrol. The price for all this was the tacit acceptance of the, also in the cities.ïsis of this kind of data Boone speaks of a 'pervasive clientelism',
tted all sectors of political and economie life, also for instance the
before and after independence (van Hoven 1995: 44-55). In
iSoulon (1988: 16) sees patronage or clientelism as 'the backbone of
fSenegalese political culture'.
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Conclusion: Clientelism and thé conservation of nature and
natural resources in Senegal
Clientelism in Senegal is thus characterized as thé backbone of political culture and
as permeating all sectors of political and économie life. The question remains what
are thé implications of thé dominance of clientelism for thé conservation of nature
and natural resources?
First a few theoretical remarks on clientelism or patronage (Flynn 1974, Fatton
1987, Boone 1994). Inhérent in a clientelist organisation are two forms of interde-
pendence, that is two forms of mutual dependence and thus partition of power. One 1
of them exists at thé top of thé organization between a small number of persons and *3
factions that are interdependent in thé sensé that they need the help of other persons
or factions to safeguard together thé vital access to the economie resources of the-
State. In order to maintain this access, they are forced to make agreements and"
alliances with at least some of the other factions involved. However, mutual ri
and suspicion are constantly present in the background. Attention is strongly^!
focused on thé behaviour of thé other factions in the centre.
The other form of interdependence is a vertical one between individuals or group
who are unequal in power. The parties are not only mutually dépendent in certaitft
respects but they are forced to maintain this interdependence by a regulär e
of goods or services. Ministers, officials and politicians at the top distribute the
resources to less powerful persons or groups in return for électoral support and 1
must continue to do so if they want to keep this support. The clients, in their t
use these faveurs for personal ends among which thé expansion of their politie«
influence must figure first. However, for thé maintenance of their position
rivais, they constantly need new faveurs from their patron. In this mutually née
exchange both parties hâve a certain power. When a patron does not
sufficient political support in return for favours given to a client, he may look !ç|
other clients (of other patrons) who will reward him more. On thé other '
when a client receives too limited favours, he may look for another, more power
patron. The results are a ceaseless process of negotiations and endless discussie
about real or potential changes of alliances within thé clientelist pyramid, wh
monopolizes ail attention. In other words, Investment in productive activities '
not have high priority for entrepreneurs-clients.
Moreover, investment is risky and may not resuit in political followers, whic
means that thé favour relationship with thé patron is at stake. In addition,]*
returns of an investment are highly dépendent on thé influence of rival factions;
changing alliances in thé clientelist network. Finally, successful investment jü
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the rise of an entrepreneur or a group who are independent of any patron or
which is an outright threat to the clientelist structure and will be punished
favours to economically less successful competitors
Ijl under clientelist conditions the government cannot really be interested in
__JHpîting productive investment, for this may mean underminine the basis of its
The very fact that enterprises or organizations function independently
relations, is regarded as a potential danger. It contravenes the
of the national leaders of encapsulating all important groups in vertical
relations.
horizontal organizations at the national, regional or local level, as
they gain momentum, are regarded as threats to thé political basis of a
faction, and they may be thwarted by new raies or conditions, or they
HI divided by assuring personal advantage to some of their leaders; or
iÜlized by creating an alternative organization; or paralysed by forceful
Si@n of state officials into the board of the organization (see Drijver and Zorge
Jystem may imply several obstacles to whatever environmental policy is
lp We will explicitly present six of them:
of pervasive clientelism, the government and party leaders are
™l||jnantly interested in economie resources as 'fuel for thé patronage-
*|Sy as Boone calls k, in order to expand and consolidate the basis of their
llApart from thé commercial circuits and foreign loans and donations,
natural resources, as soon as they represent a certain finanaal value on thé
or domestic market, also belang to those state resources which may serve
*ijb clientelist relattonships. The forest of Mbegue and thé quotas for thé
(production are examples. The patrons see to it that their clients acquire
f quotas; that they get access to a protected forest zone; that thé forestrynot apply any sanctions for infringement, and that thé transgressors are:ly liberated from prison and may go free.
Kbased on clientelism will not encourage entrepreneurs to invest in
'e activities, for this would mean providing a stimulus to give up their
§and to create potential opposition groups. The entrepreneurs, on théare well aware that the returns from long-term investments dépendoies and conditions which can be manipulated by patrons at will.
also long-term Investments m reafforestation by private persons are
f K ander such conditions.
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3 The socio économie destmy ofvery many people dépends on thé access to vital resources
by thé dientelist cbanneh, This means that changing alliances within thé clientist
pyramid absorb nearly ail attention At governmental as well as village level many
people are profoundly engagea in daily discussions on real or supposée changes.
This is apnontyfor tbem, obviously not without reason. Agriculture countsfor less, let
ahne sustainable environ-mental management.
4. Where clientelism covers many interest groups in a country, this may resuit in a
certain political stability as long as economie resources are sufficiently available
(Fatton 1987: 61-63). However, this stability is realized at the expansé of an
effective and cohérent économie policy. This policy is characterized by
incoherency and improvisation resulting from thé fact that thé interests of so
many clients must constantly be taken into account. Where clientelism K
dominant, enmronmental pohcies -will also be characterized by inconsistena.es as thf
case ofMbegue demonstrates.
5. By its vertical relations of interdependence, clientelism disrupts the horizontal
organization of less powerful groups in order to prevent their empowerment and
their potential development to an opposition group. In such a context, i
initiatives to rural development and conservation of nature and natural resources,
soon as they get any économie or political weight, may be thwarted by state ofic
andpoliticians.
6. Under conditions of pervasive clientelism, public resources are silently alloca
to private ends. Unlawful and illicit practices are inhérent to clientelism. Pub'
means are tacitly diverted and selectively distributed by thé patron in such a w
that the returns safeguard his access to thé public means. Thèse practices corru]À
social life and create political cynicism (Fatton 1987: 64). By thèse practices,
dientelism displaces any notion of the common good or thé général interest, ont,
stimulâtes thé unbndled searcb for private advantage. Thus, it créâtes a- moral contai-
for thé tragedy ofthe commons. &
Ail thèse problems relate to government policies in a clientelist system. Therefof
nowadays solutions are sought in a decentralized, participatory management'«
nature and natural resources, small-scale projects, empowerment of local groups al
support for non-governmental organizations. One may wonder whether this 1(
resource management will be able to remain free of political interventions and-1
resist thé forces of patronage or clientelism.
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